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ARGUMENT
I
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND TO ANY OF PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES AND SUCH FAILURE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS
AN ADMISSION THAT THE ARGUMENTS ARE VALID AND COMPELLING,
Respondent's brief is startling in that it does not in any way
attempt to respond to the legal theories and authorities contained
in Plaintiff's brief.

None of the cases cited and argued by

Plaintiff as controlling authority are so much as even discussed by
Respondent.
The only logical conclusion which can be drawn from this
omission is that Respondents either agree with, or have no valid
and

articuable

legal

response

to, Plaintiff's

arguments

and

authorities. Such a conclusion not only has the force of logic but
of law as well.

The Nevada Supreme Court in the case of Bates v.

Chronister. 100 Nev. 675, 691 P.2d 865, (1984) held that the
"Failure to respond to arguments in brief is deemed as a confession
of error on appeal."

Id. at 870.

This Court should consider conceded by the Respondents that
Plaintiff is correct in his second point that "The Industrial
Commission erred in failing to either consider or hold a hearing
regarding the conflicting medical opinions which clearly indicate
that the agency misconstrued the opinions of certain physicians in
rendering its final agency action."
The September 17, 1990 letter from Dr. Robert H. Burgoyne (R.
Vol. Ill at 44) as well as the October 3, 1990 letter from Dr. Jack
L. Tedrow (R. Vol. Ill at 45) were not available at the time of
1

Plaintiff's first hearing in 1987.
subsequently

failed

important evidence.

to set

The Industrial Commission

a formal hearing

or

review this

The Industrial Commission, based upon those

two medical opinions, should have reviewed the record for the
purpose of taking oral testimony from both physicians to consider
their opinions for the purpose of determining whether in fact, as
the Doctors

in their

letters

strongly

infer,

the

Industrial

Commission erred in concluding that there was no causal connection
between Mr. Cummins' 1984 industrial accident and his subsequent
inability to return to work.
Respondents apparently also concede the other stated basis for
remand, namely, that Plaintiff has never received an evidentiary
hearing on his application for permanent total disability benefits.
The Administrative Law Judge's allegation that the parties "waived
an evidentiary hearing" (R. Vol. I at 288-90) has, as Plaintiff
points out in his brief, no support in the record.

Respondents in

their brief do not even suggest that this Court can find that the
hearing was waived.
Cummins

forcefully

It should be taken as established as Mr.
argued

in

his

original

brief

that

the

"Stipulation for Submission to Medical Panel" contained in Vol. I,
page

263

of

the Record

was

solely

"....for

the purpose of

submitting this matter to a medical panel..." and not for the
purpose

of waiving

any

evidentiary

hearing

on

the

issue of

disability issues.
Mr. Cummins' subsequent attempts to obtain a hearing have
either been stayed or not ruled on by the Industrial Commission.
2

The Order sought to be reviewed here was entered without benefit of
oral testimony or cross-examination.

Mr. Cummins is

entitled to

his "day in court" and the opportunity to present all evidence in
support of his claim for lifetime total disability benefits.
This case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission to
admit for further consideration and review, the medical opinions of
Dr. Tedrow and Dr. Burgoyne, as well as that of Dr. Lewis G.
Moench,

relative

to

the

medical

causes

of

the

Plaintiff's

permanent, total disability status.
As Respondents have not contested nor rebutted this issue in
their brief, their assent should be presumed and they should be
estopped from arguing the point at oral argument.

Kinney v.

Vaccari, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 27 C.3d 348, 612 P.2d 876 (Cal. 1980).

II
THE STATEMENT OF FACT8 CONTAINED IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IS HIGHLY
SELECTIVE, ARGUMENTATIVE AND MISSTATES THE APPLICABLE LAW.
The vast bulk of Respondent's brief does not address legal
issues but rather is a highly selective, often irrelevant and
argumentative version of the facts in this matter. Contrary to the
allegations in the opening paragraphs of Respondent's Statement of
Facts, their review of the "Appellants medical, social and legal
history both prior to and after the industrial accident" is not
essential to an understanding of the issue to be decided by this
Court.

Respondent's

Statement

of

the

Facts,

when

viewed

objectively, can only be considered as an attempt to confuse the
issues and mislead the Court.
3

Much
irrelevant

of Respondent's
and

alleged

argumentative

Statement

of Fact

interpretations

of

the

contains
record.

Illustrative are the references to Plaintiff's mother's nervous
breakdown, an alleged discrepancy in the length of Plaintiff's
military service, elaboration on the reason for his discharge and
long

and

behavior."

detailed

references

to

his

alleged

"drug

seeking

Respondents devote much space to these tiltillating

details but do not use them to support any legal theory. They are
not offered to impeach Plaintiff's credibility and do not do so in
any event.

Their purpose seems to be to prejudice the Court.

As

such, much of Respondent's allegations in this section are subject
to being stricken by the Court pursuant to Rule 24(k) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure for containing "irrelevant, immaterial
or scandalous matters."
When Respondents do address relevant matters of fact contained
in the record, they do so in a most cursory, selective and selfserving

manner.

Respondent's

devote

describing how the industrial accident

only

two

sentences

to

occurred. Respondent's

account on page 7 of their brief, does not cite the record at all
and misstates the facts, getting the sequence of events wrong.
This is done in an apparent attempt to somehow create an impression
of wrongdoing or negligence by Plaintiff.
In actuality, the true facts are contained in R. Vol. Ill at
15-16 and are that on August 23, 1984, while at a customer's home
to deliver several appliances for his employer, Mr. Cummins placed
a dryer on a dollie and while walking backward up some stairs,
4

pulling the dollie after him, one of the stairs split and broke.
He fell backward and struck his lower back on the edge of the
steps. This version of the facts was adopted by the Administrative
Law Judge (R. Vol. I at 34) and should be considered controlling.
It is markedly different than Respondents' version which has no
basis in the record or reality.
In quoting from the record, Respondents further resort to
heavy

editing,

conflict

with

and

the deletion

the

Respondents'

of

inconvenient

desired

view

of

facts which
the

facts.

Illustrative is Respondents' attempt to argue that Plaintiff's own
experts do not support his physical disabled status. On page 16 of
their brief, Respondents quote a letter dated March 13, 1989 from
Dr. Michael James of South Valley Mental Health for the proposition
that Plaintiff is not disabled. Respondents, however, conveniently
deleted the following sentence from the passage they quote: "I
would appreciate it if you would not suggest to your client that I
am

in

a

position

impairment.

to

comment

on

his

(Plaintiff's)

physical

That judgment is in the hands of other consultants."

(R. Vol. I at 249). The deliberate deletion of this passage from
the portion quoted by Respondents in their brief gives a false and
misleading impression of Dr. James' opinion about this matter.
Given the significance of the deletion, it should not be considered
inadvertent.
Likewise, the citation to the record for Dr. Tedrow on pages
16 and 17 of Respondents' brief is inaccurate as the quoted
passages

do

not

appear

where

they
5

are

cited,

if

at

all.

Respondents' attempt to argue that Dr. Tedrow believed that Mr.
Cummins' entire disability was psychiatric and that therapy would
return him to work.

In fact, Dr. Tedrow's April 17, 1989 report

provides as follows: "His psychiatric impairment has been rated at
15% impairment of the whole man and I would concur with this
rating. The orthopedic (disc) problem has been rated additionally
at 10% and as the cause of his chronic pain syndrome.

As far as

pre-existence is concerned, obviously the orthopedic problem did
not. ..."

(R. Vol. I at 249-253).

Dr. Tedrow clearly attributed

at least 10% of Plaintiff's disability to his industrial injury.
Finally and most appalling, Respondents baldly allege on page
18 of their brief that "All of the doctors who have evaluated Mr.
Cummins agree that the back injury is relatively minor and would
not result in a finding of permanent total disability by itself.
(R. Vol. I at 9, 21, 246-259, 279, 334-335, 338-340, 343, 361362)."

Not only is that statement demonstrably false, not one of

the portions of the record cited actually support the allegation
made.
Similarly, a review of the record citations is enlightening.
Vol. I, page 9 of the record is the Medical Panel Report and while
it finds that Plaintiff was not temporarily totally disabled, it
does find that he does suffer from a permanent, partial disability
as a result of the industrial accident.

Page 21 is a psychiatric

assessment by Dr. Louis G. Moench who does not comment at all on
Plaintiff's

back

injury.

Page

246

is

a

Social

Security

Administration "Explanation of Determination" which reflects the
6

Social Security Administration's belief, at that time, that his
injury would confine him to light work.
report.

It is not a doctor's

Page 247 is a psychiatric assessment by Dr. Tedrow which

does not deal at all with Plaintiff's back injury.

Page 248 is a

report from Dr. James indicating that "I am unable to comment on
his

[chronic

back

instability]

psychiatric concerns."

since

I

was

consulted

for

Page 249 is another report form Dr. James

indicating that disability due to back injuries is a "judgment in
hands of other consultants."

Pages 250-252 contain an April 17,

1989 report from Dr. Tedrow indicating that the orthopedic problems
are responsible for 10% of Mr. Cummins' disability.

Page 253 is

another Dr. Tedrow "Brief Medical Report" which again attributes
disability in part to a "degenerative disk disease."

Page 254 is

a September 5, 1989 report from Dr. Tedrow which is silent about
back injuries.

Pages 255-59 contain a report from Dr. Soderberg

which does not comment on the degree of disability attributable to
the accident.

Pages 279, 334, 338-340, 343 and 361-362 are more

Social Security "Explanations of Determinations", which again are
not doctor reports, and deal primarily with the psychological
disability and do not comment in any detail on Mr. Cummins' back
injury.
Respondent's clumsy attempt to allege support from the record
that Plaintiff's back injury is minor and not sufficient for
permanent total disability is reprehensible.
majority

of

the

medical

evidence

supports

In fact, the vast
a

finding

that

Plaintiff's back injury is significant does warrant a finding to
7

permanent, total disability.

That evidence was marshalled with

accurate citations to the record

on pages

17 through

21 of

Plaintiff's original brief. As Respondents have not even attempted
to respond to that significant evidence, it need not be restated
here.
The plain fact is that the Industrial Commission erred in failing
to find the Plaintiff was entitled to permanent, total disability
since all parties concede that he is unable to work; and that the
industrial accident was an aggravating and precipitating cause of
his permanent, total disability.
While

parties

to

a

lawsuit

often

disagree

as

to

the

interpretation to be given certain facts, this is not a case of
simple

disagreement

Respondents

have

as

to

inundated

relative
their

interpretation
Statement

of

of
Facts

facts.
with

irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial allegations. They have made
baseless allegations under the pretense of citing facts, sometime
with no reference to the record.

When the record is cited to

support sweeping generalizations, it has been mischaracterized as
demonstrated above.
"The rules of appellate procedures require that parties cite
to the record when factual assertions are made...

It is improper

to make blanket assertions of fact and leave it to this Court to
ferret out evidence from the record to support those assertions."
Golden Key Realty Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985).
"The Supreme Court need not, and will not consider any facts not
properly cited to or supported by the record." Uckerman v. Lincoln
8

National Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).

Ill
THE DOCTRINE OF MITIGATION OF DAMAGE8 HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS
CASE AS IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS. OR THE LAW AND IS RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Respondents
Industrial

quote

American

Smelting

Commission, 290 P. 770, 771

&

Refining

Co, v.

(Utah 1930) for the

proposition that "when a disability can be prevented or removed by
a minor and safe operation, or by safe medical treatment, then it
is the duty of the injured employee to submit to such operation or
treatment•..."
Respondents allege

in their opening paragraph that "The

Supreme Court of Utah has long held..." this principle.

It would

be more accurate to say that the Supreme Court long ago held as
such.

This is the only Utah case cited by Respondents in their

entire brief and it is over 60 years old, having originally been
decided in 1930.

In the intervening 60 years the Utah Supreme

Court has not had occasion to so hold again or even to cite that
case as controlling precedent.

While perhaps not having been

overruled, it is sharply limited to its own facts and has been
effectively relegated to the dust bin of Utah legal precedent.
Even

if

distinguished.

it

is

of

American

some

relevance, the

Smelting

&

Refining

case

is easily

involved

the

extraordinary fact situation where the injured employee lacerated
and fractured his fingers.

The employee allowed the injury to be

dressed but refused to allow the fracture to be set or "reduced."
9

A severe infection set in eventually resulting in the loss of a
finger and considerable loss of function of the left hand at the
wrist.

The Industrial Commission had made a specific finding that

the finger could have been saved if the worker had submitted to
needed treatment.

The Supreme Court on appeal specifically found

that

evidence

"There

is

to

support

the

findings

of

the

Commission...." Id at 771.
In this case, there is no finding bv the Industrial Commission
that Mr. Cummins ever wilfully refused medical treatment which
aggravated his current medical condition.

Respondent's argument

which, as noted below, is raised for the first time on appeal, was
not considered by the Administrative Law Judge or the Industrial
Commission on review and is not supported by any of the treating or
examining doctors.
This highly creative argument is the sole construction of
Respondents' counsel and has absolutely no medical support in the
record.

Respondents premise their argument upon the statements of

Dr. Martin on September 19, 1984 that Mr. Cummins could return to
work "if the job did not entail any lifting" (R Vol. I at 100) and
Dr. Soderberg's comment of September 18, 1985 that surgery would
get him "back to work within the next four to six months" (R. Vol.
I at 51).

Respondents' error is that these statements were only a

speculation of what might occur in the future, after surgery, and
were not definite statements of present medical and physical fact
by the doctors.
None of the doctors in this case, including those serving on
10

the Medical Panel, has ever found that Mr. Cummins aggravated or
failed to mitigate his injuries.

There is not a single reference

in the record or even a finding by the Administrative Law Judge or
the Industrial Commission that his present condition is in any way
connected to his reluctance to submit to surgery.
This Court has previously held that "(The Court of Appeals)
will not consider conclusory arguments without citation to either
the record or cases involving the pivotal issue." Marchant v. Park
City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Respondents also cite the case of Nelson v. EBI Companies, 666
P.2d 1360 (Oregon 1983) as additional support of their mitigation
argument.

That case, however, is easily distinguishable and is

further not even on point.

Respondents cite it as precedent for

the proposition that Plaintiff should be denied benefits due to his
failure to submit to a surgical procedure.

Nelson, however, was

not a surgical case and the Court acknowledged that it had adopted
a different result in cases involving surgical procedures.

That

Court also took specific notice of its prior decision in demons v.
Rosebura Lumber Co., 34 Or. App. 135, 578 P.2d 429, 431 (Oregon.
App. 1978) where it held that "the claimant was not required to
submit to a recommended surgical procedure."
Such a result is in line with the general proposition that
"Courts are reluctant to require injured litigants to submit to
surgery."

Livaccari v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 118 So.2d

275, 280 (La. App. 1960) . This is especially true in cases of back
surgery. For example in Beth-Elkhorn v. Eplinq, 450 S.W.2d 814 (Ky
11

1967), a refusal to undergo a laminectomy was held to be reasonable
as

a matter

of

law,

even though

the medical

testimony

was

uncontroverted and indicated a high probability of success with
little risk.
The burden is on the employer to establish an unjustified
refusal to consent to reasonable and necessary medical evidence.
Henderson v. Booth, 281 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1973), Texas-Oklahoma
Express v. Best, 576 P.2d 1177 (Okla. 1978).

Respondents have not

even come close to meeting that burden, but rely

solely on

conjecture and innuendo.
Although Respondents on page 22 of their brief cite Professor
Larson's authoritative treatise on Workman's Compensation Law,
their citation is incomplete and does not accurately reference the
current unabridged edition of the treatise, nor for that matter, is
the treatise even supportive of Respondent's position.
The most

current

edition

of Professor

Larson's treatise

contains this statement:
But is there is a real risk involved, and particularly if
there is a considerable chance that the operation will
result in no improvement or even perhaps in a worsening
of the condition, the claimant cannot be forced to run
the risk at peril of losing his statutory compensation
rights. In such cases, and particularly in the commonest
operations presenting this problem - hernia and
interverteybral disc - most courts will not at present
disturb a finding that refusal to submit to the operation
is reasonable, since the question is a complex fact
judgment involving a multitude of variables, including
claimant's age and physical condition and his previous
surgical experience, the ratio of deaths from the
operation, the percentage of cures and many oth€>rs. The
matter cannot be determined automatically as a matter of
medical statistics and expert testimony, the surgeon who
sees several operations every day and who testifies that
the chance of fatality is only five percent naturally has
12

a different point of view than the claimant who has never
had a major operation and might quite understandably
prefer to enjoy life as best he can with his injury
rather than take a one-in-twenty chance of being dead.
In the words of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Steelmen v. Justice, 227 P2.d 647 (Okla. 1951):
The State Industrial Commission is without
jurisdiction to order the employee to submit to a
major operation involving a risk of life, however
slight, merely in order that the pecuniary
obligations created by the law in his favor against
his employer may be minimized.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, Section 13.22(f)
(June 1991).
Respondents' argument is also defective in that it is raised
for the first time on appeal.

Few principles of appellate

procedure and practice are as well established as the principle
that an Appellate Court will not consider issues raised for the
first time on appeal.

Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049

(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Brobery v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Villenuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981).
Respondents did not raise this argument below, and it is
neither part of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding and Order,
nor part of the Industrial Commission's rational in its order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Review. Respondents do not cite any
part of the record below where this argument and the facts to
support it were ever raised.

"The burden is on the parties to make

certain that the record they compile will adequately preserve their
arguments for review in event of an appeal11

Onyeabor v. Pro

Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Respondents have
13

failed

in meeting

this burden

and

the

issue

should

not be

considered for the first time on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Respondents in their brief do not address any of the arguments
and legal authorities cited by Plaintiff which mandated an award of
permanent, total disability benefits. Given this lack of response,
the

Court

should

treat

their

"confession of error" below.
as to the totally

silence

as

acquiescence

and

The record is replete with evidence

disabling

injury

Plaintiff

has

suffered

occasioned by his industrial accident.
Respondents' characterization of the evidence is shockingly
biased and grossly mischaracterizes the evidence though selective
quotations and deletions.

Some of the portions of the record

referenced by Respondent do not, in fact, support the proposition
for which they are cited.
Mr. Cummins has not failed to mitigate his injuries and was
not required to submit to surgical procedures merely to reduce
Respondents' financial exposure.
is

The failure to mitigate damages

(1) not supported by the record;

(2) not a basis of the

Administrative Law Judge's or the Industrial Commission's decision;
and (3) raised on appeal for the first time. It should be given no
weight or compelling force.
Since

Respondents

do

not

dispute

Plaintiff's

legal

contentions, this Court need not remand but may summarily order the
awarding of appropriate benefits.
14

Such a ruling is warranted by

the facts and the law.
DATED this 7th day of January, 1992.

Attorney for Pllaint

v

15
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